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COLLABORATION,	INTERDISCIPLINARITY,	AND	THE	
EPISTEMOLOGY	OF	CONTEMPORARY	SCIENCE		
Hanne	Andersen,	Department	of	Science	Education,	Øster	Voldgade	3,	DK‐1350	Copenhagen	K	
Forthcoming	in	Studies	in	History	and	Philosophy	of	Science,	A	
Abstract:	Over	the	last	decades,	science	has	grown	increasingly	collaborative	and	interdisciplinary	and	has	come	
to	depart	 in	 important	ways	from	the	classical	analyses	of	the	development	of	science	that	were	developed	by	
historically	inclined	philosophers	of	science	half	a	century	ago.	In	this	paper,	I	shall	provide	a	new	account	of	the	
structure	 and	development	 of	 contemporary	 science	based	on	analyses	 of,	 first,	 cognitive	 resources	 and	 their	
relations	 to	 domains,	 and	 second	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 cognitive	 resources	 among	 collaborators	 and	 the	
epistemic	dependence	that	this	distribution	implies.	On	this	background	I	shall	describe	different	ideal	types	of	
research	 activities	 and	 analyze	 how	 they	 differ.	 Finally,	 analyzing	 values	 that	 drive	 science	 towards	 different	
kinds	 of	 research	 activities,	 I	 shall	 sketch	 the	 main	 mechanisms	 underlying	 the	 perceived	 tension	 between	
disciplines	 and	 interdisciplinarity	 and	 argue	 for	 a	 redefinition	 of	 accountability	 and	 quality	 control	 for	
interdisciplinary	and	collaborative	science.				
Over	 the	 last	 century,	 science	 has	 grown	 increasingly	 collaborative,	 and	most	 scientific	 knowledge	
today	 is	 produced	 by	 groups	 in	 which	 multiple	 scientists	 collaborate	 in	 order	 to	 combine	 their	
knowledge,	manpower,	materials	 and	other	 resources	 (Wuchty,	 Jones,	&	Uzzi,	 2007).	 Further,	much	
scientific	research	today	cut	across	disciplinary	boundaries	(Braun	&	Schubert,	2003;	Porter	&	Rafols,	
2009).	But	at	the	same	time,	there	is	an	ever	ongoing	specialization	in	which	new	scientific	specialties	
and	disciplines	continuously	proliferate	(Stichweh,	1992;	2010).		
It	is	often	argued	that	these	developments	are	all	tightly	knit	to	the	continued	growth	of	the	scientific	
enterprise,	both	with	respect	to	the	issues	addressed	and	the	volume	of	the	activities	addressing	them.	
Thus,	 it	has	been	a	recurrent	argument	in	reports	from	research	policy	and	funding	organizations	at	
least	since	the	1960es	that,	as	science	move	to	more	and	more	complex	and	demanding	problems,	it	
requires	collaborations	both	within	and	across	disciplines.	At	the	same	time	it	 is	also	argued	that	as	
science	 moves	 towards	 grasping	 the	 world	 in	 ever	 more	 detail,	 the	 individual	 scientist	 needs	 to	
specialize	more	and	more	in	order	to	master	the	increasingly	specialized	tools	and	to	be	in	command	
of	an	ever	growing	literature.	This	has	resulted	in	paradoxical	situation	that	while	interdisciplinarity	is	
continuously	 proclaimed	 and	 demanded,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 scientists	 also	 continue	 to	 specialize	
(Weingart,	2000).		
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In	this	paper,	I	shall	address	these	developments	in	contemporary	science	and	lay	the	foundations	for	
a	philosophical	analysis	of	the	structure	and	development	contemporary	science.	 	One	the	one	hand,	
this	analysis	is	a	return	to	the	structure	of	science	and	its	development	as	a	central	topic	for	general	
philosophy	of	science;	a	topic	that	has	been	dormant	in	recent	decades	while	interest	of	philosophers	
turned	to	the	differences	between	disciplines,	historical	periods,	and	the	many	individual	elements	of	
the	 scientific	 enterprise.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 what	 I	 propose	 is	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 development	 of	
science	that	it	informed	by	the	attention	to	details	and	differences	that	has	been	prominent	since	the	
generalized	accounts	of	the	1960es	and	1970es.		
The	 account	 takes	 the	 structure	 of	 research	 activities	 as	 its	 central	 focus.	 Based	 on	 analyses	 of	 the	
cognitive	 resources	 employed	 in	 individual	 research	 activities	 it	 is	 examined	 how	 they	 relate	 to	
domains	in	a	historical	process,	and	how	their	distribution	among	the	researchers	involved	gives	rise	
to	 relations	of	 epistemic	dependence.	For	 the	sake	of	 analytical	 clarity	 I	 shall	 first	 examine	how	the	
cognitive	 resources	 employed	 in	 a	 research	 activity	 relate	 to	 domains	 and	 how	 to	 understand	 the	
individual’s	 expertise	 on	 such	 a	 picture.	 Next,	 I	 shall	 examine	 the	 epistemic	 dependence	 between	
scientists,	and	combining	the	analyses	of	cognitive	resources	and	epistemic	dependence	I	shall	provide	
a	 renewed	view	of	how	to	understand	disciplines	and	specialties	 in	 terms	of	different	 ideal	 types	of	
research	 activities	 in	 a	 two‐dimensional	 spectrum.	 Finally,	 analyzing	 values	 that	 drive	 science	 in	
various	 directions	 I	 shall	 sketch	 the	 main	 mechanisms	 underlying	 the	 perceived	 tension	 between	
disciplines	and	interdisciplinarity	and	argue	for	a	redefinition	of	accountability	and	quality	control	for	
interdisciplinary	and	collaborative	science.	
PHILOSOPHICAL	 ACCOUNTS	 OF	 DISCIPLINARY	 DEVELOPMENTS	 –	 AND	
BEYOND	
The	development	of	disciplines	or	specialties,	as	well	as	their	subdivision	into	fields	or	domains,	was	a	
major	topic	of	 interest	within	the	historically	inclined	philosophy	of	science	that	flourished	from	the	
1960es	some	decades	onwards.	Philosophers	of	science	such	as	Kuhn,	Lakatos,	Laudan,	Toulmin,	and	
Shapere	described	the	development	of	science	by	focusing	on	the	development	of	individual	areas	of	
science,	and	the	development	of	these	areas	were	then	described	in	terms	of,	for	example,	paradigm‐
induced	 normal	 science	 and	 paradigm	 changing	 revolutions	 (Kuhn,	 1970),	 progressing	 and	
degenerating	 research	 programs	 (Lakatos,	 1971),	 successive	 research	 traditions	 (Laudan,	 1977),	 or	
domains	 connected	 through	 history	 by	 chains‐of‐reasoning	 (Shapere,	 1977).	 On	 these	 traditional	
accounts	 of	 how	 individual	 areas	 within	 science	 developed	 over	 time,	 a	 scientific	 discipline	 (or	
specialty,	field	or	domain)	could	be	understood	at	the	same	time	as	an	epistemic	unit	consisting	of	a	
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set	of	closely	related	cognitive	resources	such	as,	for	example,	concepts,	models	and	theories,	and	as	a	
social	unit	consisting	of	highly	similar	experts	who	were	employing	and	at	the	same	time	developing	
their	shared	cognitive	resources.		
The	most	 detailed	 attempt	 at	 describing	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 cognitive	 and	 social	 aspects	 of	 a	
given	area	of	science	could	be	found	in	Kuhn’s	account	of	normal	science.	On	Kuhn’s	account,	scientists	
within	a	given	specialty	have	been	through	substantially	the	same	kind	of	 training,	and	through	this	
training	 they	 have	 required	 very	 similar	 and	 strong	 mental	 sets;	 what	 Kuhn	 referred	 to	 first	 as	 a	
paradigm	and	later	as	a	disciplinary	matrix.	On	this	analysis,	the	mastery	of	the	disciplinary	matrix	in	
the	 form	 of	 concepts,	 generalization,	 values	 and	 exemplars,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 apply	 it	 to	
recognize,	 define	 and	 creatively	 solve	 new	 research	 puzzles	were	 seen	 as	 the	 core	 elements	 of	 the	
expertise	 that	 enabled	 the	 individual	 practitioners	 of	 a	 given	 specialty	 to	 contribute	 to	 its	
development.	 Further,	 by	 drawing	 on	 this	 disciplinary	 matrix	 that	 they	 all	 shared,	 each	 of	 the	
practitioners	in	the	specialty	could	be	seen	as	epistemically	autonomous	agents	who	were	each	able	in	
similar	 ways	 to	 recognize	 the	 same,	 potential	 new	 research	 puzzles	 that	 could	 be	 solved	 in	 ways	
similar	to	previously	recognized	puzzles.		
Such	an	account	 implied	that	as	a	social	unit,	a	specialty	or	discipline	was	a	community	of	scientists	
with	 highly	 similar	 expertise	 based	 on	 their	 possessing	 more	 or	 less	 the	 same	 set	 of	 cognitive	
resources	 that	 enabled	 them	 to	 identify	 more	 or	 less	 the	 same	 problems	 and	 methods	 for	 their	
solution.	Conversely,	as	an	epistemic	unit,	a	specialty	or	discipline	was	a	set	of	cognitive	resources	that	
were	 transferred	historically	 from	one	generation	 to	 the	next	 through	a	particular	 form	of	 rigorous	
training.	A	specialty	or	discipline	was	therefore	characterized	by	a	close,	bipartite	relation	between	the	
scientific	 community	 and	 the	 cognitive	 resources	 that	members	of	 this	 community	 employed,	while	
the	individual	scientists	and	the	activities	that	they	engaged	in	could	be	seen	as	tokens	of	the	types	of	
similar	 community	members	working	 on	 similar	 problems.	 	 On	 this	model,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 there	
were	differences	in	the	cognitive	resources	between	different	scientists,	these	were	primarily	seen	as	a	
latent	 reservoir	 that	 only	 in	 a	 phase	 of	 crisis	 would	 become	 manifest	 as	 different	 responses	 to	
anomalies	and	thereby	serve	as	a	mechanism	for	risk	spreading	during	the	development	of	alternative	
paradigms	and	an	eventual	paradigm	shift.	
It	also	follows	from	such	an	account	that,	due	to	their	highly	similar	contributory	expertise,	1	members	
of	the	community	would	be	epistemically	autonomous	agents	largely	agreeing	on	what	to	perceive	as	
																																																													
1	The	 notion	 of	 contributory	 expertise	 has	 originally	 been	 advanced	 by	 Collins	 and	 collaborators	 (Collins	 &	
Evans,	 2002)	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 domain’s	 development,	 but	 without	 specifying	 the	 various	
components	of	this	ability.	See	Goddiksen	(2014)	for	a	more	detailed	specification	based	on	a	criticism	of	Collin’s	
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research	 questions	 and	 what	 to	 accept	 as	 solutions.	 Hence,	 although	 individual	 scientists	 as	
epistemically	autonomous	agents	could	compete	on	priority	in	solving	some	given	research	problem,	
they	would	all	have	the	same	ability	to	recognize	the	problems	and	appreciate	their	solution.	By	the	
same	token,	they	would	also	each	have	the	same	ability	to	detect	shortcomings	of	proposed	solutions	
and	provide	improvements.	Although	this	was	rarely	addressed	explicitly	in	the	accounts	advanced	by	
Kuhn	and	others,	quality	control	based	on	the	critical	scrutiny	of	new	results	by	epistemic	autonomous	
peers	could	therefore	be	seen	as	firmly	embedded	in	the	disciplinary	community.	Hence,	the	beauty	of	
this	close,	bipartite	relation	between	epistemic	resources	and	the	community	of	scientists	employing	
these	resources	was	how	it	tied	together	expertise,	education,	and	quality	control.		
At	the	same	time,	the	fundamental	challenge	for	this	account	based	on	a	bipartite	relation	between	a	
community	and	its	cognitive	resources	is	how	to	avoid	the	circularity	that	“[a]	paradigm	is	what	the	
members	of	a	scientific	community	share,	and	conversely	a	scientific	community	consists	of	men	who	
share	a	paradigm”	(Kuhn,	1970,	p.	1976).	Kuhn	argued	in	the	1970	Postscript	that	for	the	analyst,	this	
circularity	 could	 be	 broken	 by	 isolating	 the	 scientific	 community	 first	 and	 then	 the	 corresponding	
paradigms	 could	 be	 discovered	 by	 scrutinizing	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 communities’	members.	 For	 the	
“empirical	 techniques”	 required	 for	 the	 exploration	 of	 community	 structures,	 Kuhn	 referred	 to	 the	
then	emerging	 sociological	 literature	on	 communication	patterns	and	 invisible	 colleges	 as	 advanced	
by,	among	others,	Hagstrom	(1965),	Price	(Price	&	Beaver,	1966)	and	Crane	(1969).	However,	as	this	
research	 developed	 over	 the	 following	 decades	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 it	 did	 not	 offer	 the	 clear	 and	
unequivocal	identification	of	specialties	or	disciplines	that	Kuhn	had	anticipated.	Instead,	it	revealed	a	
multitude	of	criss‐crossing	relations	established	by	the	multitude	of	individual	scientists	whom	Kuhn	
had	reduced	to	more	or	 less	 identical	 tokens	of	 the	 type	of	community	members	 in	his	 focus	on	the	
close,	bipartite	relation	between	a	community	and	its	shared	cognitive	resources.	
There	 are	 several	 reasons	 why	 we	 cannot	 identify	 a	 unique	 structural	 level	 at	 which	 the	 relation	
between	 scientific	 community	 and	 cognitive	 resources	 can	 be	 unequivocally	 defined.	 First,	whereas	
scientists	within	a	given	scientific	field	may	share	a	core	set	of	well‐established	cognitive	resources,	at	
the	same	time	 it	 is	 the	aim	of	science	to	continuously	develop	 these	cognitive	resources,	and	during	
this	process	of	science‐in‐the‐making	only	a	few	scientists	within	a	given	field	may	be	sharing	the	new	
cognitive	resources	being	developed	to	supplement	the	resources	already	possessed	within	the	field.	
Second,	scientists	usually	subspecialize,	and	members	of	a	profession	will	therefore	share	some	core	
parts	of	a	set	of	cognitive	resources	while	other	parts	will	be	shared	only	by	a	few.	Third,	the	classical	
philosophical	 analyses	 of	 the	 development	 of	 science	 that	 described	 the	 cognitive	 development	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																																																										
work.	
Page	5	of	23	
	
individual	 disciplines	 or	 specialties	 largely	 ignored	 scientific	 activities	 that	 cut	 across	 disciplinary	
boundaries	and	in	doing	so	connects	multiple	sets	of	cognitive	resources.		
As	a	consequence,	 instead	of	 focusing	on	 the	bipartite	 relation	between	 the	cognitive	 resources	and	
the	 social	 community	 in	 which	 they	 are	 shared,	 while	 reducing	 the	 individual	 scientists	 and	 the	
activities	 that	 they	 engage	 in	 to	 tokens	 of	 disciplinary	 types,	 the	 analysis	 presented	 here	 turns	 the	
picture	upside	down	and	 focuses	 instead	on	 the	 individual	 research	 activity	 as	 it	 is	 spanned	by	 the	
dimensions	of	cognitive	resources	and	epistemic	relations	between	the	scientists	employing	them.	On	
this	 background,	 the	 analysis	 presents	 a	 continuous	 and	 two‐dimensional	 spectrum	 of	 research	
activities	 from	 which	 four	 ideal	 types	 can	 be	 described.	 Further,	 the	 analysis	 reveals	 important	
epistemic	forces	that	underlie	current	developmental	patterns	in	contemporary	science	and	indicates	
how	the	tension	between	disciplinary	and	interdisciplinary	developments	can	be	resolved.2		
COGNITIVE	CONVERGENCE	OR	DIVERGENCE	
What	we	have	learned	from	previous	decades	of	work	in	philosophy	and	sociology	of	science	is	that	a	
scientific	domain	and	the	cognitive	resources	employed	within	it	are	inherently	dynamic	entities	that	
are	continuously	developing.	Hence,	 in	the	absence	of	 fixed	boundaries,	what	identifies	the	cognitive	
resources	of	a	domain	is	their	trajectory	through	history	as	they	both	develop	and	are	transferred	to	
new	generations	of	experts.		
This	historical	trajectory	is	also	the	back‐bone	from	which	the	training	of	a	new	generation	draws	its	
material:	exemplary	problems	in	the	domain	as	considered	from	its	contemporary	stand	and	accounts	
of	 how	 they	have	been	 solved.	During	 their	 training,	 novices	 are	 required	 again	 and	 again	 to	 study	
concrete	problem	solutions	and	 to	 solve	 series	of	 closely	 related	problems	 for	 themselves.	Through	
this	training	they	gradually	develop	the	ability	to	classify	new	problems	as	instances	of	known	types	
and	to	recognize	and	employ	the	cognitive	resources	adequate	for	solving	them	(Andersen,	2000).	The	
																																																													
2	By	focusing	on	this	spectrum	of	research	activities,	the	analyses	offered	here	has	a	different	focus	from	recent	
accounts	 of	 the	 character	 of	 contemporary	 science	 such	 as,	 e.g.	 the	 post‐normal	 science	 account	 offered	 by	
Funcovich	and	Ravetz	(1993;	1995)	that	focuses	on	the	uncertainty	implied	in	research	on	complex	phenomena,	
or	the	triple‐helix	account	offered	by	Etzkowich	(2008;	Etzkowitz	&	Leydesdorff,	2000)	that	focuses	on	relations	
between	knowledge	producing	institutions.	It	also	differs	from	the	mode	1/mode	2	account	offered	by	Nowotny	
and	 collaborators	 (Gibbons	 et	 al.,	 1994;	 Nowotny,	 Scott,	 &	 Gibbons,	 2001)	 that	 focuses	 on	 temporary	 and	
transdisciplinary	collaborations	carried	out	in	a	context	of	application,	but	does	neither	consider	the	spectrum	
ranging	from	the	disciplinary	to	the	transdisciplinary	activities,	nor	the	epistemic	dependence	relations	between	
the	involved	researchers	as	this	account	does.	
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ability	 to	 recognize	 problems	 belonging	 to	 a	 domain	 and	 using	 the	 domain’s	 cognitive	 resources	 to	
solve	 them	 in	 a	 way	 that	 will	 be	 recognized	 and	 accepted	 by	 other	 practitioners	 using	 the	 same	
resources	to	solve	other	domain‐relevant	problems	is	one	of	the	core	preconditions	for	the	expertise	
required	to	contribute	to	the	domain’s	further	development.	Traditional	disciplinary	degree	programs	
usually	train	novices	in	a	series	of	basic	domains	as	a	precondition	for	later	developing	contributory	
expertise	 in	 some	subspecialty	of	 the	discipline.	Later	 in	 their	 training,	 as	 the	novices	specialize	and	
gradually	 become	 experts,	 they	 will	 be	 trained	 in	 more	 specialized	 domains,	 and	 as	 specialization	
increases,	more	 emphasis	will	 be	 on	 applying	 the	 newly	mastered	 cognitive	 resources	 to	 genuinely	
new	situations	and	to	investigate	their	limits	and	how	to	transgress	these	same	limits.	
However,	scientific	research	activities	in	contemporary	science	are	not	necessarily	confined	to	a	single	
domain.3	Instead,	 contemporary	 scientific	 research	 activities	 may	 be	 cognitively	 convergent	 in	 the	
sense	that	they	draw	on	a	set	of	cognitive	resources	drawn	from	a	particular	domain,	or	they	may	be	
cognitively	divergent	in	the	sense	that	they	draw	on	a	combination	of	cognitive	resources	drawn	from	
different	domains.	This	is	not	a	distinction	in	kind,	but	rather	the	two	ends	on	a	continuum	such	that	
any	given	scientific	activity	can	be	more	or	less	cognitively	convergent	or	cognitively	divergent.		
	
Figure	1.	A	one‐dimensional	cognitive	spectrum	of	research	activities.	
This	can	be	illustrated	by	a	one‐dimensional	spectrum	where	activities	within	research	fields	such	as,	
for	 example,	 quantum	 field	 theory	 or	 analytic	 inorganic	 chemistry	 will	 be	 found	 in	 the	 end	 of	 the	
spectrum	 that	 is	 characterized	by	 cognitive	 convergence.	 Scientific	 research	 activity	 in	 one	 of	 these	
fields	 usually	 draws	 on	 a	 relatively	 uniform	 set	 of	 cognitive	 resources	 developed	 within	 domains	
belonging	 to	 the	 field	 itself.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	 scientists	 in	 the	 field	 have	 typically	 developed	
convergent	 contributory	 expertise	 by	 having	 been	 through	 more	 or	 less	 similar	 training	 and	 a	
subsequent	life	in	the	profession	of	the	field	so	that	there	is	be	a	high	degree	of	overlap	in,	for	example,	
their	 ontological	 beliefs,	 and	 the	 concepts,	models,	 generalizations	 and	methods	 that	 they	 draw	 on,	
although	 through	 their	 subspecialization	 they	may	 each	 also	 have	 developed	mastery	 of	 additional,	
highly	 specialized	 cognitive	 resources	 which	 their	 collaborators	 have	 not.	 In	 this	 sense,	 their	
contributory	expertise	is	convergent,	but	not	fully	identical.	
																																																													
3	This	should	not	be	read	as	a	claim	that	previous	research	activities	were	confined	to	single	domains.	It	 is	the	
aim	 of	 this	 paper	 to	 investigate	 the	 current	 spectrum,	 not	 to	 give	 an	 historical	 account	 of	 its	 historical	
development.	
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In	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum,	characterized	by	cognitive	divergence,	are	scientific	activities	within	
research	 fields	 such	 as,	 for	 example,	 nanoscale	 drug	 delivery,	 geomicrobiology	 or	 integrative	
neuroscience	that	each	draw	on	several	very	different	domains.	Scientists	in	these	research	fields	will	
often	have	been	trained	in	different	disciplines	consisting	of	each	their	set	of	different	domains,	and	
they	will	 therefore	have	very	divergent	contributory	expertise.	 In	principle,	a	single	researcher	may	
acquire	mastery	of	cognitive	resources	from	domains	from	multiple	disciplines,	for	example	through	
training	 for	multiple	 degrees	 or	 through	 long‐term	 collaborations	with	 collaborators	 from	multiple	
disciplines.	But	often,	research	 in	such	research	 fields	will	be	carried	out	by	collaborations	 in	which	
the	contributory	expertise	is	distributed	among	the	individual	scientists	participating	in	the	research	
activity.	Due	to	their	different	training	they	will	draw	on	different	sets	of	cognitive	resources	and	there	
will	be	less	overlap	in	their	ontological	beliefs	and	in	the	concepts,	generalizations	and	methods	that	
they	 draw	 on	 and	 values	 that	 they	 subscribe	 to.	 Their	 contributory	 expertise	 can	 therefore	 be	
described	as	divergent,	but	not	completely	disjunct.	
Whether	 such	 contributions	 that	 cut	 across	 disciplines	 are	 provided	 by	 individuals	 or	 by	
collaborations,	 the	 cognitive	 resources	 from	 the	 involved	 domains	 need	 to	 interlock,	 that	 is,	 there	
needs	to	be	some	connection	between,	for	example,	selected	concepts,	models	or	generalizations.	This	
interlocking	requires	that	scientists	have	some	additional	skills	beyond	their	contributory	expertise;	
skills	that	enable	them	to	recognize	enough	of	the	key	elements	from	another	domain	to	participate	in	
the	 interlocking	 process.	 Usually,	 recognizing	 such	 key	 elements	 requires	 that	 they	 have	 acquired	
some	 basic	 elements	 of	 the	 cognitive	 resources	 within	 this	 other	 domain,	 such	 as	 some	 basic	
recognition	of	important	ontological	categories	and	some	basic	understanding	of	key	concepts	(Petrie,	
1976).4	This	 is	 the	 core	element	of	 the	 interlocking	expertise	 that	 enables	 scientists	 in	 a	 cognitively	
divergent	 research	 field	 to	 interlock	 their	 own	 contributions	 with	 contributions	 from	 their	
collaborators	who	draw	on	different	sets	of	cognitive	resources.5	The	interplay	between	contributory	
																																																													
4	Although	this	point	bears	resemblance	to	Galison’s	(1997)	idea	of	special	 ‘pidgin’	 languages	used	in	a	trading	
zone,	 the	 analysis	 provided	 here	 differs	 from	 Galison’s	 by	 not	 assuming	 a	 relation	 of	 incommensurability	
between	different	fields.	
5	Collins	and	Evans	(2002)	have	introduced	the	notion	of	‘interactional	expertise’	to	denote	the	kind	of	expertise	
that	 is	 required	 to	 “interact	 interestingly	with	participants”	 (p.	254).	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	contributory	expertise	
that	 enables	 a	 scientist	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 development	 within	 a	 field,	 interactional	 expertise	 enables	
interaction,	 typically	 in	 the	 form	 of	 communication,	 but	 not	 active,	 contributory	 participation	 in	 research	
activities	that	lead	to	new	scientific	contributions.	Collins	and	Evans	have	not	provided	much	detail	on	this	kind	
of	expertise	beyond	the	vague	description	of	the	ability	to	interact	“interestingly”.	For	a	criticism,	see	Goddiksen	
(2014)	 as	well	 as	 Plaisance	 &	 Kennedy	 (2014).	 Further,	much	 of	 their	 work	 has	 been	 directed	 at	 describing	
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and	interlocking	expertise	is	thus	an	important	aspect	of	collaborative	scientific	research	activities	in	
cognitively	divergent	areas,	but	an	aspect	 that	has	previously	been	 largely	 ignored	when	describing	
scientific	knowledge	production	from	a	primarily	disciplinary	perspective.	
FRACTAL	AND	CRISSCROSSING	DOMAIN	STRUCTURES	
To	exemplify	 the	analysis	described	above,	 consider	 the	domain	structure	of	 a	 traditional	discipline	
such	as	physics.	In	physics,	members	of	the	profession	have	usually	been	through	similar	training	at	
some	basic	level	and	they	therefore	share	a	fair	amount	of	cognitive	resources	obtained	through	this	
basic	 training,	 including	 the	 domains	 of	 mechanics,	 thermodynamics,	 statistical	 physics,	
electromagnetism,	 optics,	 and	 some	 basic	 relativity	 theory	 and	 quantum	 physics.	 These	 are	 well‐
established	 and	 quite	 stable	 domains	 for	 which	 a	 core	 of	 cognitive	 resources	 displays	 very	 little	
change,	 if	any	at	all.	Hence,	although	a	new	generation	of	practitioners	will	 follow	different	paths	 in	
their	 later	 research	 career,	 they	 can	 rely	 on	 the	 stability	 of	 these	 core	 domains	 to	 provide	 stable	
bridging	between	the	developing	domains	in	which	they	are	engaged.		
At	 later	 stages	 of	 their	 training,	 members	 of	 the	 profession	 gradually	 specialize	 differently,	 and	
whereas	physicists	in	general	may	share	some	basic	cognitive	resources	on,	for	example,	the	electrical	
and	thermal	properties	of	solids	and	liquids,	only	some	have	specialized	deeper	into	condensed	matter	
physics	to	engage	with	these	topics	in	detail,	and	they	again	have	subspecialized	into	many	different	
subfields	 that	 at	 the	 same	 time	may	 have	 a	 variety	 of	 overlaps	 between	 them.	Hence,	 there	will	 be	
different	 degrees	 of	 overlap	 between	 individual	 physicists’	 contributory	 expertise.	 A	 high	 degree	 of	
overlap	will	be	 found	 in	a	group	of	condensed	matter	physicists	working	on,	 for	example,	defects	 in	
semi‐conductors,	 less	 overlap	 when	 comparing	 to	 another	 group	 of	 condensed	 matter	 physicists	
working	on	surface	catalysis,	and	lesser	yet	when	comparing	to	a	group	of,	say,	high	energy	physicists.	
Still,	 due	 to	 their	 similar	 basic	 training,	 there	 will	 be	 by	 far	 much	 more	 overlap	 in	 contributory	
expertise	 for	 scientists	 from	 all	 these	 various	 groups	 of	 physicists	 than	 when	 comparing	 to	 the	
contributory	 expertise	 of,	 for	 example,	 chemists	 or	 biologist	 in	 general.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 although	
physicists	may	share	a	large	amount	of	cognitive	resources	developed	during	their	early	training	in	the	
																																																																																																																																																																																																										
interactional	expertise	as	the	expertise	required	of	a	scholar	in	science	studies	in	order	to	interact	with	scientists	
for	the	purpose	of	performing	case	studies,	while	 ignoring	the	 issue	of	how	interactional	expertise	 in	different	
domains	of	 science	 can	 combine	with	 contributory	 expertise	 in	 the	production	of	 new	 research	 contributions	
within	 the	 sciences	 themselves.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 notion	 of	 interlocking	 expertise	 introduced	 here	 is	 chosen	 to	
focus	 explicitly	 on	 the	 process	 of	 interlocking	 partial	 contributions	 from	 different	 areas	 of	 expertise	 in	 the	
production	of	a	genuine	 research	contribution	 in	a	 cognitively	divergent	 research	 field.	At	 the	same	time,	 it	 is	
neutral	to	the	question	of	whether	 ‘integration’	 is	part	of	the	process	and	thereby	also	neutral	to	the	standard	
distinction	between	inter‐	and	multidisciplinarity.	
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profession,	not	all	of	these	resources	may	form	an	equally	active	part	in	their	contributory	expertise	as	
they	 develop	 science	 through	 their	much	more	 narrowly	 defined	 scientific	 research	 activities	 at	 its	
frontier.	 Instead,	 as	 they	 specialize	 into	 specialties	 and	 subspecialties,	 the	 cognitive	 resources	 that	
they	draw	on	in	the	creative	development	of	new,	additional	resources	may	often	be	highly	specialized	
and	shared	by	only	few.	In	this	way,	domains	can	be	said	to	have	a	fractal	structure	(cf.	Abbott,	2001).	
At	the	same	time,	there	are	also	crisscrossing	relations	between	domains.	In	a	group	of,	for	example,	
highly	 specialized	 condensed	 matter	 physicists,	 the	 participating	 scientists	 may	 have	 different	
contributory	expertise	at	 some	very	advanced	and	detailed	 level,	but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	due	 to	 their	
similar	training	not	only	in	the	basic	areas	of	physics	but	also	more	specialized	in	condensed	matter	
physics,	they	have	very	rich	resources	available	to	interlock	their	individual	contributions,	even	when	
their	 contributory	 expertise	 differ.	 Because	 cognitive	 resources	 are	 widely	 shared,	 even	 on	 an	
advanced	level,	only	very	little	(if	any)	simplification	is	needed	in	the	interlocking	process.	In	contrast,	
in	 an	 interdisciplinary	 group,	 for	 example	 a	 group	of	 physicists	 and	 chemists	 investigating	 colloidal	
nanocrystals,	 there	 is	 less	 overlap	 between	 their	 contributory	 expertise	 and	 more	 interlocking	
expertise	is	needed	in	order	to	interlock	their	individual	contributions	to	the	collaboration.	
Acquisition	 of	 the	 basic	 elements	 of	 the	 cognitive	 resources	 from	 another	 domain	 required	 for	
interlocking	 expertise	 implies	 some	 degree	 of	 simplification.	 This	 simplification	 has	 an	 important	
implication:	When	mastering	only	 some	 simplified	 form	of	 the	 cognitive	 resources	of	 some	domain,	
scientist	 in	 need	 of	 them	 will	 have	 to	 defer	 to	 experts	 mastering	 the	 full	 details.	 Collaborative	
interlocking	therefore	typically	also	involve	an	element	of	epistemic	dependence.		
EPISTEMIC	DEPENDENCE	OR	INDEPENDENCE	
As	 described	 above,	 much	 contemporary	 research	 in	 cognitively	 divergent	 fields	 takes	 place	 in	
collaborations	 in	 which	 collaborators	 with	 different	 areas	 of	 contributory	 expertise	 combine	 their	
cognitive	 resources.6	When	 researchers	 collaborate	 in	 this	 way	 they	 typically	 each	 provide	 partial	
contributions	from	within	their	own	area	of	expertise	and	in	other	areas	defer	to	their	collaborators	
																																																													
6	There	 is	 a	 rich	 literature	 in	 sociology	 of	 science	 as	 well	 as	 in	 organizational	 science	 and	 in	 team	 science	
research	 on	 the	 organization	 of	 collaboration,	 including	 analyses	 of	 their	 various	 organizational	 formats	 (e.g.	
Shrum,	 Chompalov,	 &	 Genuth,	 2001;	 Shrum,	 Genuth,	 &	 Chompalov,	 2007),	 their	 formation	 (e.g.	 Genuth,	
Chompalov,	&	Shrum,	2000)	and	productivity	(e.g.	Lee	&	Bozeman,	2012),	the	role	of	emotions	in	collaborations	
(Parker	 &	 Hackett,	 20201),	 or	 inherent	 tensions	 in	 collaborative	 research	 (e.g.	 Hackett,	 2005).	 However,	 the	
focus	in	this	paper	is	solely	on	the	relations	of	epistemic	dependence	between	collaborators,	while	room	is	left	
for	including	an	additional	third	dimension	to	the	spectrum	of	research	activities	representing	power	relations.		
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(Andersen	 &	 Wagenknecht,	 2013).	 But	 also	 collaboration	 between	 researchers	 with	 highly	 similar	
contributory	 expertise	 may	 build	 on	 a	 division	 of	 labor	 that	 makes	 collaborators	 epistemically	
dependent,	 for	 example	 if	 they	 divide	 a	 large	 amount	 of	 similar	 tasks	 among	 them.	7	In	 contrast	 to	
these	 scientific	 research	 activities	 characterized	 by	 some	 degree	 of	 epistemic	 dependence,	 other	
scientific	research	activities	also	exist	in	which	scientists	are	not	epistemically	dependent,	for	example	
if	 they	work	alone,	or	 if	 they	insist	on	meticulously	checking	every	detail	 for	themselves	rather	than	
deferring	 to	 a	 collaborator.	 Hence,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 dimension	 of	 cognitive	 divergence	 or	
convergence,	 another	 important	 dimension	 of	 scientific	 research	 activities	 is	 the	 dimension	 of	
epistemic	 dependence	 or	 independence	 between	 the	 scientists	 engaged	 in	 the	 activity.	 Again,	 this	
distinction	 is	 not	 a	 distinction	 in	 kind,	 but	 rather	 two	 ends	 on	 a	 continuum,	 such	 that	 any	 given	
scientific	research	activity	can	be	characterized	by	more	or	less	epistemic	(in)dependence	among	the	
participants	in	the	activity.		
	
Figure	2.	A	one‐dimensional	epistemic	dependence	spectrum	of	research	activities.		
The	 qualification	 should	 be	 noted	 here	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 scientist	 engaging	 in	 a	 scientific	 research	
activity	 as	 fully	 epistemically	 independent	 is	 a	 chimera.	 Modern	 knowers	 are	 never	 completely	
epistemically	 independent	and	autonomous,	not	even	 in	their	 field	of	specialization.	 In	any	scientific	
field,	participants	necessarily	stand	on	the	shoulders	of	 their	predecessors.	However,	 for	the	sake	of	
analysis	I	shall	for	the	time	being	follow	Goldberg	(2011)	in	distinguishing	between	direct	epistemic	
dependence	 on	 another	 individual	 and	 diffuse	 epistemic	 dependence	 on	 a	 community.	 Given	 this	
distinction,	I	shall	here	bracket	scientists’	epistemic	dependence	on	the	community	of	predecessors	for	
knowledge	 that	has	been	 so	widely	 shared	 through	 a	 long	historical	process	 that	 the	original	 act	of	
deference	 has	 vanished	 from	 sight.	 Instead,	 I	 shall	 focus	 on	 epistemic	 dependence	 on	 direct	
collaborators	 for	 their	 contributions	 to	 current,	 collaborative	 scientific	 research	 activities.	 	 Hence,	
while	acknowledging	that	epistemic	dependence	on	previous	generations	of	scientists	pervades	all	of	
																																																													
7	Similar	 to	 this	distinction	between	 collaborations	among	 scientists	with	different	 contributory	 expertise	and	
scientists	 with	 similar	 contributory	 expertise,	 Thagard	 has	 introduced	 a	 distinction	 between	 peer‐similar	
collaborations	 in	 which	 collaborators	 have	 substantially	 the	 same	 training,	 knowledge	 and	 skills,	 and	 peer‐
different	 collaborations	 where	 collaborators	 have	 different	 training,	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 (Thagard,	 1997;	
2006).	 Thagard	 also	 introduces	 two	 additional	 categories:	 employer/employee	 and	 teacher/apprentice	
collaborations.	However,	focus	in	this	paper	will	be	on	the	distribution	of	expertise	among	scientists	regardless	
of	their	power	relations.		
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science	and	remains	its	inevitable	basis,	what	is	specifically	at	issue	here	is	the	epistemic	dependence	
that	holds	between	scientists	engaged	in	ongoing	scientific	research	activities	as	part	of	science‐in‐the‐
making.	 In	the	final	section	of	 the	paper	I	shall	return	to	the	 implications	of	adopting	the	chimerical	
ideal	of	the	autonomous	knower.	
THE	SPECTRUM	OF	CONTEMPORARY	RESEARCH	ACTIVITIES	
The	 distinction	 between	 the	 dimensions	 of	 cognitive	 divergence	 or	 convergence	 and	 of	 epistemic	
dependence	 or	 independence	 enables	 a	 fine‐grained	 analysis	 of	 different	 ideal	 types	 of	 scientific	
research	 activities	 and	 their	 characteristics.	 Importantly,	 cognitive	 divergence	 or	 convergence	 and	
epistemic	dependence	or	independence	need	to	be	treated	as	different	dimensions.	Although	scientists	
engaging	in	a	cognitively	divergent	research	activity	will	often	be	epistemically	dependent,	they	need	
not	be	so.	Instead,	multiple‐trained	scholars	may	be	capable	of	engaging	in	a	scientific	research	activity	
that	 cuts	 across	 domains	 from	 multiple	 disciplines	 without	 having	 to	 defer	 to	 the	 expertise	 of	
collaborators.	 Similarly,	 although	 scientists	 engaged	 in	 a	 cognitively	 convergent	 scientific	 research	
activity	will	often	have	similar	contributory	expertise	and	will	therefore	be	capable	of	working	more	
or	 less	 independently	of	 each	other,	 they	need	not	do	 so.	 Instead,	 as	described	above,	 collaborators	
with	convergent	contributory	expertise	may	be	epistemically	dependent	because	they	have	divided	a	
massive	amount	of	similar	labor	among	them	which	it	would	be	much	too	time	consuming	for	any	of	
them	to	repeat.	The	combination	of	 the	dimension	of	cognitive	convergence	and	divergence	and	 the	
dimension	of	epistemic	dependence	and	 independence	therefore	yields	a	 two‐dimensional	spectrum	
of	 scientific	 research	 activities	 that	 include	both	 disciplinary	 and	 interdisciplinary	division	 of	 labor,	
and	independent	and	autonomous	agents	in	both	disciplinary	and	interdisciplinary	research.		
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Figure	3.	The	two‐dimensional	spectrum	of	scientific	research	activities	with	four	different	ideal	types	of	scientific	research	
activities.	
In	the	following,	I	shall	first	provide	a	conceptual	clarification	of	four	ideal	types	of	research	activities	
within	this	two‐dimensional	spectrum.	Next,	I	shall	provide	an	analysis	of	some	of	the	various	norms	
that	 drive	 research	 activities	 in	 different	 directions	 within	 the	 two‐dimensional	 spectrum	 and	 the	
tensions	that	they	may	create.	
DISCIPLINARY	AND	INTERDISCIPLINARY	DIVISION	OF	LABOR	
Scientists	 usually	 collaborate	 in	 order	 to	 do	more	 or	 better	 work	 than	 they	 could	 have	 performed	
individually	 (Maienschein,	 1993;	 Thagard,	 2006;	 Wray,	 2002).	 Collaborative	 activities	 therefore	
typically	 imply	some	epistemic	dependence	among	collaborators.	Collaborations	may	bring	 together	
scientists	 with	 similar	 contributory	 expertise	 or	 scientists	 with	 different	 kinds	 of	 contributory	
expertise.	Both	kinds	of	 collaboration	 involve	 epistemic	dependence,	but	 they	differ	with	 respect	 to	
cognitive	divergence	or	convergence.		
In	 disciplinary	 divisions	 of	 labour,	 collaborative	 research	 activities	 that	 are	 cognitively	 convergent	
take	 place	 between	 scientists	who	 all	 share	much	 the	 same	 cognitive	 resources	 and	 therefore	 have	
highly	similar	contributory	expertise,	but	who	divide	some	amount	of	labor	among	them	that	it	would	
be	 difficult	 for	 any	 one	 of	 the	 to	 overcome	 alone.	 Since	 it	 would	 be	 as	 time	 consuming	 for	 the	
individual	 participant	 of	 the	 collaborative	 activity	 to	 repeat	 the	work	 of	 the	 others	 to	 establish	 the	
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result	for	him‐	or	herself	instead	of	conferring	to	a	collaborator,	they	will	have	to	defer	to	each	other	
for	 those	 partial	 contributions	 that	 result	 from	 the	 divided	 labor,	 and	 in	 this	 respect	 they	 are	
epistemically	dependent.	But	at	the	same	time,	since	they	draw	on	highly	similar	cognitive	resources,	
these	individual	contributions	easily	interlock,	and	hence	only	little	additional	interlocking	expertise	is	
required	for	the	collaborators	to	interlock	their	individual	contributions.		
Conversely,	 collaborative	 research	 activities	 that	 are	 cognitively	 divergent	 will	 often	 take	 place	
between	 scientists	 who	 collaborate	 in	 order	 to	 combine	 cognitive	 resources	 that	 are	 distributed	
among	 them	 and	which	 they	 do	 not	 all	 possess	 individually.	8	But	 combining	 the	 contributions	 that	
they	 each	 provide	 based	 on	 their	 different	 contributory	 expertise	 requires	 that	 their	 individual	
contributions	interlock.	Since	they	derive	from	the	application	of	divergent	sets	of	cognitive	resources,	
this	requires	additional	interlocking	expertise.	Hence,	this	kind	of	interdisciplinary	division	of	labour	
requires	that	sufficient	interlocking	expertise	is	also	represented	among	the	collaborators.	The	extent	
of	 the	 interlocking	expertise	 required	 is	 related	 to	 the	degree	of	 interlocking	of	 cognitive	 resources	
that	 is	 intended.	 Hence,	 for	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 integration	 of	 the	 various	 contributions,	 the	 required	
interlocking	 expertise	 is	 quite	 extensive.	 Conversely,	 if	 the	 various	 contributions	merely	 need	 to	 be	
juxtaposed	 there	 may	 be	 less	 mutual	 dependence	 between	 collaborators	 and	 only	 need	 for	
interlocking	expertise	on	some	isolated	points.9	
LEGENDS	OF	INDEPENDENCE	IN	DISCIPLINARY	AND	INTERDISCIPLINARY	RESEARCH	
Epistemically	independent	researchers	can	be	seen	as	autonomous	epistemic	agents	who	contribute	to	
science‐in‐the‐making	 individually	rather	than	collaboratively.	One	type	of	non‐collaborative	activity	
is	 performed	 by	 epistemically	 independent	 scientists	 who	 work	 in	 a	 cognitively	 convergent	 area	
within	which	they	each	act	as	an	autonomous	epistemic	agent.	As	argued	above,	however,	this	idea	of	
fully	 epistemic	 independence	 is	 a	 chimera;	 in	 their	 research	 activities	 scientists	 will	 always	 be	
standing	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 their	 predecessors,	 historical	 as	 well	 as	 contemporary.	 Nevertheless,	
although	this	idea	of	scientists	brought	up	in	the	same	tradition	to	act	as	independent	and	autonomous	
																																																													
8	Leonelli	and	Ankeny	(2015)	have	recently	introduced	the	term	repertoires	to	denote	the	ensemble	of	material	
and	social	conditions	that	makes	it	possible	for	scientists	to	collaborate.	Thus,	repertoires	include	the	collection	
of	 cognitive	 resources	 required	 for	an	 interdisciplinary	 collaboration,	but	 the	analysis	offered	by	Leonelli	 and	
Ankeny	does	not	address	the	other	dimension	included	in	the	account	presented	here,	namely	the	importance	of	
epistemic	dependence	among	collaborators.	
9	By	 stressing	 the	 continuous	 character	 of	 the	 spectrum	 ranging	 from	 cognitive	 convergence	 and	 cognitive	
divergence	as	well	as	the	fact	that	 interlocking	may	happen	at	various	degrees,	this	account	does	not	 lead	to	a	
strong	 division	 between	 inter‐	 and	 multidisciplinarity	 as	 activities	 different	 in	 kind,	 but	 see	 them	 rather	 as	
differing	in	the	degree	of	divergence	and	of	interlocking.	
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agents	 is	 a	 legend,	 it	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 disciplinary	 legend	 on	 which	 previous	 models	 of	 the	
development	of	science	have	largely	built.		
For	epistemically	independent	researchers	working	in	a	cognitively	divergent	area,	there	is	a	similar	
legend	of	scientists	who	have	acquired	full	contributory	expertise	in	all	relevant	domains	and	who	are	
therefore	 capable	 of	 doing	 multi‐	 or	 interdisciplinary	 research	 all	 alone	 as	 omniscient	 geniuses.	
Interlocking	 is	 still	 required	between	 the	various	 sets	of	 cognitive	 resources,	but	while	 the	 fact	 that	
individual	 scientist	 has	 full	 contributory	 expertise	 in	 all	 domains	 involved	 eliminates	 the	 need	 for	
deference	 to	 the	 expertise	 of	 others,	 it	 does	 not	 eliminate	 the	 cognitive	 challenges	 of	 interlocking	
concepts,	models	or	methods	originally	developed	to	describe	different	domains.	
EPISTEMIC	VALUES,	QUALITY	CONTROL	AND	ACCOUNTABILITY	
Given	 the	 ideal	 types	of	 research	activities	discussed	above,	 I	 shall	 close	by	analyzing	how	different	
values	 may	 create	 tensions	 in	 contemporary	 science,	 first,	 between	 interdisciplinarity	 and	 quality	
control,	and	second,	between	collaboration	and	accountability,	and	I	shall	sketch	how	these	tensions	
can	be	resolved.	
As	described	above,	scientists	collaborate	in	groups	in	order	to	combine	manpower,	materials	or	other	
resources	in	an	effort	to	produce	new	knowledge	that	they	either	could	not	have	produced	alone	at	all,	
or	only	at	higher	costs	or	with	substantial	delay.	For	example,	research	that	is	labor	intensive	can	be	
performed	at	a	higher	speed	by	dividing	work	among	collaborators.	Similarly,	research	that	is	resource	
intensive	 can	 be	 performed	 more	 efficiency	 by	 sharing	 resources.	 Further,	 collaboration	 is	
epistemically	 beneficial	 because	 it	 enables	 knowledge	 to	be	 developed	 and	used	by	many	people	 in	
many	 different	 fields,	 and	 that	 research	 in	 which	 more	 people	 direct	 their	 attention	 to	 the	 same	
puzzles	 tend	 to	provide	more	desired	 results	as	well	 as	better	error	detection	 (see	e.g.	Fallis,	2006;	
Thagard,	1997;	2006;	Wray,	2002;	2006	 for	arguments	of	 this	 type).	Hence,	 several	different	values	
are	involved	in	establishing	collaborative	activities	as	epistemically	beneficial,	including	acquiring	new	
knowledge	as	quickly	and	as	cost‐effective	as	possible,	having	new	knowledge	distributed	as	widely	
and	 as	 quickly	 as	 possible,	 and	 acquiring	 as	much	 new	 knowledge	 as	 possible	without	 introducing	
errors.10	
																																																													
10	It	 may	 be	 a	matter	 of	 dispute	 whether	 these	 values	 are	 seen	 as	 epistemic	 or	 non‐epistemic.	 However,	 the	
overall	argument	of	this	paper	does	not	depend	on	whether	there	is	a	clear	distinction	between	epistemic	and	
non‐epistemic	values.	
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Similarly,	scientists	combine	cognitive	resources	from	different	fields	in	order	to	solve	problems	that	
cannot	 be	 solved	 adequately	within	 any	of	 the	 involved	 fields	 alone.	 Combining	 cognitive	 resources	
from	 different	 fields	 in	 a	 new	 way	 can	 enable	 new	 solutions	 not	 imaginable	 within	 any	 of	 the	
individual	fields,	enable	the	creation	of	new,	and	from	a	disciplinary	perspective	very	bold	hypotheses,	
lead	to	a	substantial	expansion	of	the	empirical	content	of	the	hypotheses	advanced,	and	enable	new	
conceptual	combinations	with	the	potential	for	establishing	new	theoretical	frameworks.	Hence,	again	
several	 different	 values	 such	 as	 progress,	 ingenuity,	 and	 creativity	 are	 involved	 in	 establishing	
interdisciplinary	activities	as	epistemically	beneficial.		
However,	 collaboration	 and	 interdisciplinarity	 are	 not	 only	 epistemically	 beneficial,	 they	 can	 also	
imply	 epistemic	 costs.	 For	 example,	 the	 benefit	 of	 being	 more	 people	 who	 can	 produce	 and	
disseminate	 more	 results	 needs	 to	 be	 balanced	 with	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 increased	 time	 required	 for	
communication	and	coordination.	Similarly,	 the	benefit	of	combining	cognitive	resources	that	enable	
new	solutions	to	problems	needs	to	be	balanced	with	the	cost	that	it	makes	the	criteria	of	success	less	
unequivocal	 and	 therefore	more	 opaque.	 Hence,	 for	most	 of	 the	 values	 described	 above,	 a	 balance	
needs	to	be	found	between	costs	and	benefits.	I	shall	here	not	attempt	to	derive	a	full	epistemic	value	
theory	(see	e.g.	Goldman	1999	and	Fallis	2006	for	various	versions	of	such	a	theory).	Instead,	I	shall	
focus	 in	 the	 following	 on	 two	 particular	 topics	 that	 have	 been	 subject	 of	 intense	 discussion	 among	
scientists	in	recent	years,	namely	accountability	and	quality	control.		
When	collaborating,	scientists	divide	labor	among	them.	Doing	so	they	repeatedly	defer	to	each	other	
and	 accept	 partial	 contributions	 by	 testimony	 from	 others	 rather	 than	 establishing	 each	 individual	
step	in	the	research	process	themselves.	This	mutual	deference	runs	counter	to	a	strongly	entrenched	
value	in	science,	namely	that	of	epistemic	(or	intellectual)	autonomy.	As	described	in	detail	by	Fricker	
(2006),	the	ideal	of	the	autonomous	knowers	who	take	no	one	else’s	work	for	anything	but	accept	only	
what	 they	 have	 found	 out	 for	 themselves,	 relying	 purely	 on	 their	 own	 cognitive	 faculties	 and	
investigative	and	inferential	powers,	is	an	old	and	very	strong	ideal	in	philosophy.		
Implicit	 in	 the	 idea	 of	 epistemic	 autonomy	 is	 also	 that,	 as	 autonomous	 knowers,	 scientists	 are	
individually	responsible	and	accountable	for	the	knowledge	claims	that	they	each	advance.	In	contrast,	
when	collaborators	defer	to	each	other	for	their	partial	contributions	to	the	final	result,	accountability	
and	 responsibility	 cannot	 be	 ascribed	 to	 the	 individual	 in	 the	 same	way.	 In	 research	 performed	 by	
groups	rather	than	by	individuals,	accountability	therefore	appears	to	be	challenged.11		
																																																													
11	See	e.g.	(Rennie,	1994;	Rennie,	Yank,	&	Emanuel,	1997;	Task	Force	on	Authorship,	2000;	Nature	editors,	2007)	
for	expressions	of	this	view.	
Page	16	of	23	
	
Further,	also	implicit	in	the	idea	of	epistemic	autonomy	is	that	scientists	always	encounter	the	results	
obtained	by	others	critically	to	reassure	themselves	of	their	correctness,	rather	than	accepting	them	as	
testimony.	But	this	requires	that	they	are	competent	for	the	job.	On	the	disciplinary	legend	described	
above,	this	competence	follows	naturally.	According	to	the	disciplinary	legend,	the	practitioners	within	
a	 discipline	 have	 undergone	 similar	 training	 and	 have	 absorbed	 the	 same	 literature	 and	 drawn	 the	
same	 lessons	 from	 it.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 they	 share	 the	 pursuit	 of	 the	 same	 goals,	 namely	 to	 solve	
problems	that	in	characteristic	ways	resemble	other	problems	that	have	been	solved	by	the	profession	
before.	 They	 are	 in	 principle	 each	 capable	 of	 pursuing	 the	 puzzles	 that	 their	 field	 defines.	 Further,	
when	 exchanging	 results,	 a	 scientist	 is	 capable	 of	 critically	 scrutinizing	 a	 new	 knowledge	 claim	
produced	by	a	colleague	before	accepting	it,	and	also	of	providing	the	justification	for	it	if	needed.	This	
is	 the	 background	 for	 the	 argument	 that	 it	 is	 the	 critical	 scrutiny	 of	 results	 within	 the	 scientific	
community	 that	 makes	 normal	 science	 immensely	 efficient	 in	 identifying	 any	 loci	 of	 trouble.	 In	
contrast,	when	a	research	activity	involves	multiple	disciplines,	there	is	not	a	well‐defined	community	
of	practitioners	who	are	all	expected	to	be	equally	capable	of	critically	scrutinizing	new	results.	In	this	
situation,	the	quality	control	that	on	the	disciplinary	legend	has	been	seen	as	resulting	from	the	critical	
reception	of	new	results	in	the	community	of	equal	peers	is	perceived	as	challenged.	
Finally,	these	two	concerns	mutually	enforce	each	other:	the	wider	the	cognitive	divergence,	the	more	
need	 for	 epistemic	 dependence	 and	 the	 further	 the	 research	 activities	move	 away	 from	 traditional	
ideals	 of	 individual	 accountability	 and	 community	 based	 quality	 control.	 In	 this	 way,	 there	 is	 an	
inherent	tension	in	the	development	of	contemporary	science	between,	on	the	one	hand,	collaboration	
and	accountability,	and	on	the	other	hand	between	interdisciplinarity	and	quality	control.	
COGNITIVE	RESOURCES,	INTERLOCKING	AND	QUALITY	CONTROL	
The	 tension	 between	 interdisciplinarity	 and	 quality	 control	 has	 its	 root	 in	 the	 disciplinary	 legend’s	
implicit	 premise	 that	 members	 of	 a	 particular	 scientific	 community	 are	 in	 principle	 each	 equally	
capable	of	producing	and	assessing	a	given	result.	However,	as	described	in	previous	sections	this	is	a	
chimera.	 Even	 scientists	 trained	 in	 the	 same	 domain	 through	 similar	 education	 will	 differ	 in	 their	
capacity	 for	 assessing	 a	 result	 produced	 by	 a	 peer,	 both	 because	 they	 may	 have	 subspecialized	
differently,	 and	 because	 they	 may	 differ	 in	 their	 intellectual	 capacity	 as	 such.	 Hence,	 even	 within	
monodisciplinary	 domains,	 quality	 control	 is	 a	 fragile	 process,	 and	 empirical	 work	 in	 sociology	 of	
science	on	peer	review	has	long	documented	substantial	disagreements	among	reviewers	even	within	
individual	 disciplines	 (see	 e.g.	 Cole,	 Cole,	 &	 Simon,	 1981).	 For	 interdisciplinary	 research,	 problems	
intensify	because	the	individual	assessor	is	usually	not	in	command	of	all	cognitive	resources	involved	
and	is	in	this	sense	epistemically	inferior	to	the	group	which	produced	it.	This	inability	of	referees	to	
assess	 all	 aspects	 of	 an	 interdisciplinary	 piece	 of	 work	 epistemic	 has	 been	 a	 recurrent	 topic	 in	
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discussion	 of	 peer	 review	 in	 interdisciplinary	 research	 (see	 e.g.	 Porter	 &	 Rossini,	 1985;	 Mansilla,	
Feller,	 &	 Gardner,	 2006;	 Mansilla,	 2006;	 Langfeldt,	 2006).12	Proponents	 of	 interdisciplinarity	 have	
maintained	 that	 knowledge	 assessors	 do	 not	 appreciate	 what	 is	 achieved	 by	 interlocking	 various	
cognitive	resources,	vice	versa,	critics	of	interdisciplinarity	have	maintained	that	knowledge	assessors	
are	incapable	of	identifying	shortcomings	outside	their	own	area	of	expertise.	13		
To	meet	this	criticism,	the	 implications	of	an	epistemic	 inequality	between	knowledge	producer	and	
knowledge	assessor	need	to	be	addressed.	Importantly,	this	inequality	concerns	not	only	the	cognitive	
resources	 covered,	 but	 also	 their	 interlocking.	Whereas	 coverage	 of	 relevant	 cognitive	 resources	 is	
achieved	 by	 most	 assessment	 models,	 there	 is	 much	 variation	 with	 respect	 to	 interlocking	 and	
epistemic	dependence.	Thus,	a	model	in	which	multiple	scientists	with	different	contributory	expertise	
provide	 individual	 reviews	 to	 a	 given	 piece	 of	 work	 (practiced,	 for	 example,	 by	 interdisciplinary	
journals	 like	Behavioural	and	Brain	Science),	 easily	 covers	 all	 relevant	 cognitive	 resources,	but	 there	
may	be	little,	if	any,	interlocking	of	these	into	a	synthesized	assessment.	Such	a	model	may	work	well	
for	examining	the	quality	of	each	disciplinary	aspect,	but	at	the	same	time	have	difficulties	recognizing	
the	 benefits	 gained	 from	 the	 interdisciplinary	 interlocking.	 A	 central	 ‘synthesizer’	may	 therefore	 be	
added	who	integrates	all	assessments	into	one,	as	it	is	often	done	by	a	journal	editor.	However,	for	this	
to	produce	a	satisfactory	result	the	synthesizer	needs	sufficient	expertise	to	provide	the	same	degree	
of	 interlocking	 as	 the	 knowledge	 producing	 group.	 Such	 omniscience	 is	 rare,	 and	 this	 model	 may	
therefore	also	have	difficulties	recognizing	benefits	gained	from	interdisciplinary	interlocking.	A	third	
model	 is	 therefore	 to	 bring	 multiple	 experts	 together	 as	 a	 panel	 and	 in	 this	 group	 merge	 their	
individual	assessments,	similar	to	the	interlocking	of	contributions	in	the	knowledge	producing	group.	
Several	 empirical	 studies	 of	 peer	 review	 of	 interdisciplinary	 research	 proposals	 suggest	 that,	 given	
sufficient	interaction	between	panel	members,	transparent	distribution	of	labor,	an	adequate	balance	
of	perspectives,	and	open	discussion	of	different	standards,	this	is	a	viable	model	(Mansilla	et	al.,	2006;	
Mansilla,	 2006;	 Langfeldt,	 2006;	 Huutoniemi,	 2010;	 Huutoniemi,	 2012).14	At	 the	 same	 time,	 such	 a	
																																																													
12	It	should	be	noted	that	much	of	this	 literature	has	addressed	funding	decisions	about	future	research	rather	
than	quality	decisions	about	performed	research.	Obviously,	the	former	includes	additional	challenges	due	to	the	
inherently	more	uncertain	character	of	the	decision,	cf.	Porter	&	Rossini	(1985)	
13	Part	of	 this	criticism	is	raised	 implicitly	rather	than	explicitly	 in	printed	documents.	However,	a	widespread	
‘unease’	 about	 the	 ‘dubious	 quality’	 of	 interdisciplinary	 research	 has	 been	 reported	 in	many	 publications	 on	
quality	control	and	on	interdisciplinarity	(see	e.g.	Feller,	2006;	Mansilla	et	al.,	2006;	Weingart,	2000).		
14	More	 recently,	 research	 in	 peer	 review	 has	 started	 to	 address	 groupthink	 and	 similar	 the	 undesired	
phenomena	that	may	occur	in	group	judgements	(Olbrechts	&	Bornmann,	2010).	Similar	considerations	are	also	
seen	in	the	social	epistemology	literature	on	decision	making	in	groups	(Solomon,	2006).	However,	the	possible	
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model	 is	 labor	 intensive,	 and	 while	 grant	 agencies	may	 bring	 panels	 together	 physically	 for	 major	
funding	decisions,	panel	models	are	rare	–	if	at	all	possible	–	for	the	vast	multitude	of	interdisciplinary	
journal	papers	that	are	continuously	submitted	for	peer	review.	
However,	what	 has	 been	 largely	 overlooked	 in	 the	 debate	 about	 quality	 control	 in	 interdisciplinary	
research	is	how	standard	peer	review	practices	developed	from	the	interdisciplinary	legend’s	focus	on	
the	 individual	 scientist	 deviates	 from	 contemporary	 practices	 oriented	 rather	 towards	
interdisciplinary	 collaboration.	 Thus,	 while	 most	 interdisciplinary	 research	 is	 now	 produced	 by	
groups,	peer	review	of	reports	of	the	performed	research,	even	in	highly	interdisciplinary	fields,	is	still	
largely	 performed	 by	 individuals.	 Hence,	 most	 journals	 send	 manuscripts	 to	 individual	 scientist,	
stressing	 that	 they	 are	not	 allowed	 to	 involve	 anyone	else	 in	 the	 review	of	 the	manuscript	 (see,	 for	
example,	 the	 COPE	 Ethical	 Guidelines	 for	 Peer	 Reviewers	 issued	 by	 the	 Committee	 on	 Publication	
Ethics,	publicationethics.org).	 Instead,	 in	order	to	restore	the	epistemic	equality	between	knowledge	
producer	and	knowledge	assessor	a	more	suitable	practice	would	be	to	request	reviews	explicitly	from	
groups	 that	 are	 similar	 to	 the	knowledge	producing	group,	 i.e.	 groups	working	on	 similar	problems	
and	spanning	similar	areas	of	expertise.	Hence,	while	most	current	journal	guidelines	stress	that,	 for	
example,	junior	collaborators	may	only	be	involved	in	the	review	process	after	explicit	permission	by	
the	editor,	thereby	signaling	that	such	collaborative	reviews	are	the	exception	rather	than	the	rule,	this	
suggestion	turns	the	standards	upside‐down	and	requires	that	collaborators	are	 involved.	On	such	a	
model,	 knowledge	producer	and	knowledge	assessor	would	be	 tokens	of	 the	 same	 type,	not	only	 in	
drawing	 on	 the	 same	 multitude	 of	 cognitive	 resources,	 but	 also	 by	 ensuring	 that	 the	 synthesis	 of	
disciplinary	 viewpoints	 is	 conducting	 similarly	 during	 knowledge	 production	 and	 knowledge	
assessment.	
EPISTEMIC	AUTONOMY,	DEPENDENCE	AND	ACCOUNTABILITY	
In	 resolving	 the	 tension	 between	 collaboration	 and	 accountability	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 as	
argued	 earlier	 in	 this	 paper,	 the	 idea	 of	 epistemic	 autonomy	 is	 largely	 a	 chimera	 that	 sets	 up	 an	
unrealistic	ideal	for	accountability.	Similar	arguments	about	epistemic	autonomy	being	unrealistic	in	
general	 has	 been	made	 by	 Fricker	 (2006),	who	 points	 out	 that	 this	 ideal	 holds	 only	 for	 an	 infinite,	
superior	being,	otherwise	the	epistemic	autonome	will	be	severely	cognitively	lacking,	and	by	Coady	
(2002)	 who	 redescribes	 the	 autonomous	 knower	 as	 the	 autonomous	 ignoramus.	 Second,	
accountability	 appears	 to	 be	 challenged	 because	 it	 cannot	 be	 unequivocally	 ascribed	 to	 a	 single	
individual,	 but	 that	 does	 not	mean	 that	 it	 cannot	 be	 distributed	 among	 collaborators	 in	 a	 group	 or	
																																																																																																																																																																																																										
dangers	of	groupthink	and	similar	phenomena	lie	outside	the	scope	of	this	paper.	
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ascribed	 to	 the	 group	 as	 a	 plural	 subject.	 Hence,	 as	 I	 shall	 argue	 in	 the	 following,	 accountability	 in	
collaborative	research	can	be	restored	by	making	its	distribution	among	group	members	transparent.	
As	argued	by	Hardwig	(1985;	1991),	in	order	for	a	scientist	to	trust	a	claim	made	by	a	collaborator,	the	
collaborator’s	 reasons	 for	 this	claim	must	be	better	 than	 the	 reasons	 that	 the	scientist	 can	come	up	
with	alone.	The	scientist	must	therefore	have	reasons	to	believe	that	the	collaborator	is	competent	and	
knows	what	would	be	good	reasons	for	the	claim,	has	worked	conscientiously	and	actually	has	these	
good	 reasons,	 and	 speaks	 truthfully	 in	 advancing	 the	 claim.	 In	 other	 words,	 trust	 is	 based	 on	 the	
trustee	 having	 good	 reasons	 for	 believing	 in	 the	 epistemic	 and	moral	 character	 of	 the	 collaborator	
whose	 claim	 is	 being	 trusted.	 These	 good	 reasons	 form	 part	 of	 the	 scientist’s	 total	 warrant	 for	
believing	the	claim	in	question.	However,	in	contrast	to	first‐order	warrants	for	believing	a	scientific	
claim,	 such	 as	 observation	 reports,	 theoretical	 inferences	 etc.	 that	 are	 usually	 presented	 explicitly,	
second	 order	 warrants	 for	 a	 believing	 a	 scientific	 claim	 ‐	 i.e.	 the	 reasons	 for	 adopting	 another	
scientist’s	 testimony	 as	 reasons	 for	 believing	 the	 claim	 ‐	 are	 rarely	 explicated	 at	 all	 and	 therefore	
remain	largely	opaque.			
It	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 this	 opaqueness	 of	 trust	 together	 with	 an	 unrealistic	 ideal	 of	 the	 individual’s	
epistemic	 autonomy	 that	 the	 accountability	 of	 collaborative	 science	 has	 been	 questioned.	Hence,	 to	
restore	accountability	in	collaborative	research	the	role	of	trust	needs	be	made	transparent.	First,	the	
distribution	 of	 direct	 accountability	 for	 partial	 contributions	 among	 individual	 collaborators	 can	 be	
made	 transparent.	 This	 step	 has	 been	 taken	 recently	 by	 several	 science	 journals,	 including,	 for	
example,	 all	 journals	 from	 the	 Nature	 group	which	 since	 2009	 has	 required	 that	 articles	 contain	 a	
contribution	statement	that	specifies	the	contribution	of	every	author.		
Second,	 collaborators	 need	 to	 consider	 their	 warrant	 for	 believing	 in	 the	 epistemic	 and	 moral	
character	of	each	of	their	collaborators.	An	initial	move	in	this	direction	can	be	found	in	the	so‐called	
Vancouver	 Guidelines,	 a	 set	 of	 recommendations	 on	 journal	 publication	 issued	 by	 the	 International	
Committee	 of	 Medical	 Journal	 Editors	 (ICMJE).	 Since	 2013	 these	 guidelines	 have	 specified	 that	
“authors	should	have	confidence	in	the	integrity	of	the	contributions	of	their	co‐authors”	(ICMJE,	2014,	
p.	2).15	To	assess	whether	a	collaborator	is	competent	in	a	given	field	requires	that	the	assessor	is	at	
																																																													
15	While	 the	 Vancouver	 Guidelines	 only	 specify	 that	 authors	 should	 have	 confidence	 in	 the	 integrity	 of	 their	
collaborators,	in	Hardwig’s	term	their	moral	character,	the	press	release	issued	by	the	ICMJE	at	the	release	of	the	
2013	 modification	 of	 the	 Vancouver	 Guidelines	 goes	 a	 step	 further	 and	 specifies	 that	 authors	 should	 have	
confidence	 in	co‐authors’	 integrity	and	ability,	 thus	 including	also	their	epistemic	character.	However,	 this	has	
not	 yet	moved	 into	 the	official	 recommendation	document.	 Further,	 both	documents	 have	 remained	 silent	 on	
how	confidence	in	collaborators’	moral	and	epistemic	character	should	be	established.		
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least	 as	 competent.	 Hence,	 calibration	 of	 trust	 is	 dependent	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 epistemic	 status	
between	 collaborators.	 Ascribing	 responsibility	 for	 a	 group’s	 result	 therefore	 needs	 adjustments	
between,	for	example,	juniors	and	seniors,	or	between	scientists	with	different	areas	of	expertise.	That	
there	 is	 such	a	difference	has	also	been	 the	 intuition	of	 several	 investigation	committees	examining	
cases	 of	 scientific	misconduct	 (see	 e.g.	 Andersen,	 2014	 for	 details).	 Yet,	 rather	 than	 claritying	 how	
trust	is	calibrated,	given	different	levels	of	seniority	and	expertise,	there	is	a	tendency	instead	to	take	
recourse	 to	 control	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 avoid	 trust	 altogether.	 For	 example,	 biomedical	 editors	 have	
proposed	 that	 for	 all	 co‐authored	 papers,	 a	 senior	 PI	 should	 be	 assigned	 a	 special	 function	 as	 the	
‘guarantor’	 who	 vouches	 for	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	work	 in	 its	 entirety	 (Rennie	 et	 al.,	 1997).	 But	 this	
proposal	simply	recreates	the	disciplinary	legend’s	ideal	of	an	individual	autonomous	knower,	even	in	
a	 collaborative	 setting	 where	 it	 makes	 little	 sense.	 Instead,	 what	 is	 needed	 is	 to	make	much	more	
explicit	the	practices	by	which	scientists	actually	do	assess	each	other.	Seniors’	assessments	of	juniors’	
epistemic	 character	 is	 obviously	 an	 integral	 and	 explicit	 part	 of	 training	programs.	But	 seniors	 also	
assess	their	peers,	including	peers	from	different	fields,	by	standards	such	as	dialoguing	practices	or	
explanatory	responsiveness	(Wagenknecht,	2014).	Similarly,	various	standards	can	be	described	that	
are	important	in	the	assessment	of	moral	character,	such	as	honesty,	loyalty,	cooperativeness,	fairness,	
or	 consideration	 for	 others	 (Frost‐Arnold,	 2013).	 Hence,	 although	 the	 relations	 of	 epistemic	
dependence	 implies	that	accountability	 in	collaborative	research	is	both	distributed	and	graded,	this	
does	not	imply	that	it	needs	to	remain	opaque.	
REVISITING	THE	STRUCTURE	OF	SCIENCE	
Most	philosophical	analyses	from	the	20th	century	on	the	development	of	science	were	analyses	of	the	
development	of	individual	scientific	disciplines,	usually	described	in	terms	of	the	development	of	their	
paradigms,	research	programs	or	research	traditions.16	While	collaboration	and	interdisciplinarity	are	
far	from	new	phenomena,	for	the	historically‐oriented,	developmental	accounts	that	developed	in	the	
1960es	 and	 1970es	 by	 Kuhn	 and	 others,	 focus	 was	 still	 predominantly	 on	 disciplines	 as	 they	 had	
developed	 over	 the	 preceding	 two	 centuries	 to	 become	 the	 defining	 structure	 of	 the	 scientific	
enterprise	 that	was	 expanding	 rapidly	 during	 the	 postwar	 era	when	 the	 accounts	were	 developed.	
Further,	investigating	how	science	developed	over	time,	a	turn	to	history	seemed	a	natural	move,	and	
hence	 cases	 illustrating	 the	 accounts	 were	 often	 drawn	 from	 previous	 centuries	 and	 showed	 how	
individual	 scientists	 contributed	 to	 the	 disciplinary	 tradition,	whether	 by	 expanding	 or	 changing	 it.	
																																																													
16	Laudan’s	brief	reflection	on	the	possibility	of	grafting	or	amalgamating	research	traditions	(Laudan,	1977,	pp.	
103‐105)	 as	 well	 as	 Fleck’s	 (1980)	 early	 idea	 of	 individual	 scientists’	 simultaneous	 membership	 of	 multiple	
thought	 collectives	 serve	 as	 the	 two	main	 exceptions.	 However,	 neither	 of	 these	 ideas	 has	 been	 substantially	
explored	as	analyses	of	interdisciplinary	science.	
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During	the	half	century	that	has	passed	since	the	publication	of	Kuhn’s	Structure	and	the	work	of	the	
philosophers	he	 inspired,	 collaborative	 and	 interdisciplinary	practices	have	 come	 to	play	 significant	
roles	 for	 the	 scientific	 enterprise.	 Time	 is	 therefore	 ripe	 for	 revisiting	 and	 rethinking	 philosophical	
analyses	of	the	structure	of	science	and	its	development.	
Such	an	undertaking	necessarily	goes	beyond	the	scope	an	individual	paper.	However,	what	this	paper	
has	shown	is,	 first,	 that	the	degree	of	cognitive	convergence	and	divergence	as	well	as	the	degree	of	
epistemic	 dependence	 among	 collaborators	 are	 key	 dimensions	 for	 understanding	 the	 structure	 of	
contemporary	science,	second,	 that	an	analysis	 in	terms	of	 these	dimensions	not	only	reveals	where	
our	 understanding	 of	 science	 may	 be	 influenced	 by	 untenable	 ideas,	 but	 also	 how	 to	 revise	 our	
understanding	of	such	important	aspects	of	scientific	practice	as	accountability	and	quality	control.	
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